greig - Spanish translation

In exceptional circumstances it might be possible for a party to rely upon an estoppel against a State which attempts to argue that its statement is a reservation. [...] While this is a matter of interpretation rather than the application of equitable principles, it is in keeping with notions of fairness and good faith which underlie the treaty relations of States”. / D.W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”.

In exceptional circumstances it might be possible for a party to rely upon an estoppel against a State wich attempts to argue that its statement is a reservation. [...] While this is a matter of interpretation rather than the application of equitable principles, it is in keeping with notions of fairness and good faith which underlie the treaty relations of States D. W. Greig, Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?", Australian Yb.

408. Even though doctrine has barely contemplated the problem from this standpoint, See, however, Frank Horn, op. cit., pp. 263-272, and, for a clearer and more concise account, D. W. Greig, op. cit., p. 26.

Aun si la doctrina no contempla el problema desde ese punto de vista Véase, Frank Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, op. cit., págs. 263 a 272 y, más conciso, pero más claro, D. W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, op. cit., pág. 26.

Even if the distinction is not always obvious, there is a tremendous difference between application and interpretation. “The mere fact that a ratification is conditional does not necessarily mean that the condition needs to be treated as a reservation.” D. W. Greig, op. cit., p. 31.

Aunque la distinción no siempre es evidente, existe en ella la enorme diferencia entre aplicación e interpretación... “El sólo hecho de que una ratificación sea condicional no necesariamente significa que la condición se haya de considerar como reserva.” D.W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, op. cit., pág. 31.

But, a substance test throws a burden on those at the receiving end (or tribunals that may decide disputes) to recognize a statement for what it is rather than for what it is titled”. Richard W. Edwards, Jr., “Reservations to Treaties”, Michigan Journal of International Law 1989, pp. 368-369; see also D. W. Greig, para. 297 above.

Sin embargo, el criterio del contenido impone a los destinatarios (o a los tribunales que han de decidir los litigios) la carga de reconocer una declaración por lo que es y no por su enunciado Richard W. Edwards, Jr., “Reservations to Treaties”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 1989, págs. 368 y 369; véase, también D. W. Greig, supra, párr. 297.

(9) Even though doctrine has barely contemplated the problem from this standpoint, / See, however, Frank Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. (note 266 above), pp. 33 and 263—272 and, for a clearer and more concise account, D.W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, Australian Yb.I.L. 1995, p. 26.

9) Aun si la doctrina no aborda el problema desde ese punto de vista Véase, sin embargo, Frank Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. (nota 266 supra), págs. 33 y 263 a 272, y, más sucinto pero más claro, D. W. Greig, "Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?", Australian Y.B.I.L., 1995, pág. 26.

or explicitly, See, for example, Richard W. Edwards, Jr., “Reservations to Treaties”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 1989, pp. 369 and 372; or D. W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?” Australian YbIL, 1995, p. 26.

o explícita Véanse, por ejemplo; Richard W. Edwards, Jr., “Reservations to Treaties”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 1989, págs. 369 y 372, o D.W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, Australian Yb.

Ibid.; see also Giorgio Gaja, “Unruly treaty reservations”, Le droit international à l’heure de sa codification – Études en l’honneur de Roberto Ago (Milan, Giuffrè, 1987), vol. I, pp. 310–313; D. W. Greig, “Reservations: equity as a balancing factor?”, Australian Yearbook of International Law 1995, pp. 28–29; Frank Horn, op. cit., pp. 41–43; and Paul Reuter, op. cit., p. 71.

Ibíd.: Giorgio Gaja, “Unruly Treaty Reservations”, en Le droit international à l’heure de sa codification – Études en l’honneur de Roberto Ago, Milán, Giuffrè, 1987, vol. I, págs. 310 a 313; D. W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, Australian Y.B.I.L. 1995, págs. 28 y 29; Frank Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, op. cit., págs. 41 a 43; o Paul Reuter, Introduction au droit des traités, tercera edición revisada y aumentada por Philippe Cahier, París, P.U.F., 1995, pág. 71.

It should be pointed out, as Professor Greig does, that when they formulate objections to reservations or react to interpretative declarations formulated by other contracting parties, States or international organizations often go on to propose their own interpretation of the treaty’s provisions. D. W. Greig, op. cit., pp. 24 and 42-45.

Cabe destacar en particular, como lo señala el Profesor Don Greig, que cuando formulan objeciones a las reservas o reaccionan ante las declaraciones interpretativas formuladas por otras partes contratantes, los Estados o las organizaciones internacionales con frecuencia proponen, a su vez, su propia interpretación de las disposiciones del tratado D. W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, op. cit., págs. 24 y 42 a 45.

300. In such situations, declarations made in respect of provisions to which any reservation is prohibited must be considered to constitute interpretative declarations. “This would comply with the presumption that a State would intend to perform an act permitted, rather than one prohibited, by a treaty and protect the State from the possibility that the impermissible reservation would have the effect of invalidating the entire act of acceptance of the treaty to which the declaration was attached.” D. W. Greig, op. cit., p. 25.

En esas hipótesis, las declaraciones formuladas en relación con disposiciones respecto de las cuales se prohíben las reservas se han de considerar declaraciones interpretativas. “Esto estaría de acuerdo con la presunción de que un Estado tiene intención de realizar un acto autorizado y no uno prohibido por el tratado y protegería a ese Estado de la posibilidad de que la reserva ilícita tuviera por efecto invalidar enteramente el acto de aceptación del tratado al cual acompañaba la declaración” D. W. Greig, “Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Factor?”, op. cit., pág. 25.